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Peer Sexual Harassment: Holding Educational Institutions to
a Higher Standard
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, judicial treatment of sexual harassment
has undergone a dramatic transformation. What was once judicially un-
recognized behavior that devastated an individual's mental, physical, and
financial well-being is now a form of intolerable conduct punishable by a
court of law. The major change came in 1986 when the United States
Supreme Court, following the lead of several circuit courts of appeal,'
addressed the injustice of sexual harassment by recognizing claims for
both quid pro quo2 and hostile environmen sexual harassment in the
employment arena. Since then, the Court has expanded liability for sex-
ual harassment by refusing to require psychological injury for recovery in
"hostile environment" sexual harassment claims and by recognizing
claims for same-sex sexual harassment
The Supreme Court's interpretation of sexual harassment in the
employment arena has received much attention from both the media and
1. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
2. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Court stated that, under Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994), "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of
the subordinate's sex [quid pro quo sexual harassment], that supervisor 'discriminates' on the
basis of sex." Met/tor, 477 U.S. at 64.
3. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. "[A] plaintiff may [also] establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment
[hostile environment sexual harassment]." Id.
4. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (holding that the harassment need
not seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being or cause the plaintiff to suffer injury
to recover under a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim). Id. at 22.
5. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). The issue was
whether workplace harassment can violate Title VII's prohibition against "discrimination ...
because of ... sex" when the harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex. Id. at
1000. In this case, Oncale was forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions by his co-
workers, physically assaulted in a sexual manner, and threatened with rape. Id. at 1001. The
Court held that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of...
sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant are of the same sex." Id. at 1002.
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judicial scholars. This attention, however, had the effect of drawing the
focus away from another arena in which sexual harassment is highly
prevalent--the schools of the United States. Not until June of 1998 did
the Supreme Court address the issue of teacher-student sexual harass-
ment.6 However, students, parents, and the educational system had to
wait an additional year before the Court would examine peer sexual har-
assment, a much more frequent and serious type of educational sexual
harassment.' Prior to the Supreme Court's recent Davis decision, the cir-
cuit courts had been unable to agree as to whether this type of harass-
ment was actionable, and, if so, what standard should be applied in de-
termining when an educational institution should be held liable. The
Davis Court ended this controversy in a five-to-four decision holding that
educational institutions can be held liable for peer sexual harassment. In
doing so, however, the majority adopted a controversial standard of li-
ability that will promote inefficiency and ignorance with respect to peer
sexual harassment claims within the educational system.
This comment explores the evolution of the controversy involving
peer sexual harassment under Title IX of the Educational Amendments
of 1972 ("Title IX").' Part I discusses the problem of peer sexual harass-
ment in the educational setting. Part II examines Title IX, the statute
governing sex discrimination claims in educational programs. This ex-
amination is followed, in Part III, by an analysis of the case law expressly
recognizing educational sexual harassment as an actionable claim under
Title IX, and, In Part IV, by a discussion of existing standards of liability
under Title IX. Part V addresses the split treatment of peer sexual har-
assment standards by the circuit courts and Part VI discusses the stan-
dard set forth by the Supreme Court in Davis. Part VII advances the ar-
gument that Title IX demands a more stringent standard for institutional
liability than that provided by Davis and addresses the appropriate stan-
dard for imposing such liability.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In 1993, The American Association of University Women
6. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (concluding that
damages are unavailable under Title IX in circumstances involving the sexual harassment of a
student by a teacher unless an official of the school district, who, at a minimum, has authority to
institute corrective measures on the district's behalf, has actual notice of, and is deliberately
indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct).
7. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., No. 97-843, 1999 WL 320808 (U.S. May 24,
1999), rev'g 120 F.3d 1390 (lth Cir. 1997).
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
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("AAUW") undertook an in-depth study to examine the problem of sex-
ual harassment in the public schools of the United States? The findings
of the study confirmed that peer sexual harassment is a serious problem
for both girls and boys in the educational environment." The AAUW
survey revealed that sexual harassment is a common experience: four of
five students (eighty-one percent) in grades eight through eleven re-
ported that they had been the target of some form of sexual harassment
in school." The harassment was most likely to have begun while the sin-
dents were in grades six through nine. 2 The harassment complained of
included being subjected to sexual jokes and comments (sixty-six per-
cent), being touched or grabbed (fifty-three percent), being flashed
(forty-nine percent), being forced to kiss someone (eighteen percent),
being forced to do something other than kissing (eleven percent), being
called gay or lesbian (seventeen percent), and being spied on while
dressing or showering (seven percent)."
Of the eighty-one percent of students who reported being the target
of sexual harassment, eighteen percent were harassed by a school em-
ployee.14 However, the overwhelming majority of the ongoing harassment
in schools is perpetrated by peers.1" Nearly four of five students (seventy-
nine percent) who reported harassment had been targeted by a current or
former student. 6 The bulk of this harassment takes place in halls, class-
rooms, or right outside the schools.17 Other common places included
gymnasiums or pools, cafeterias, locker rooms, and rest rooms."
The AAUW survey found that the impact of this harassment is sig-
nificant, causing students to suffer not only educationally, but also emo-
9. Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, HOSTILE HALLWAYS, THE AAUW SURVEY ON
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1993). The AAUW study consisted of 1,632
questionnaires completed by public school students in grades eight through eleven from 79
schools across the continental United States. Id. at 5. The survey addressed sexual harassment
with regard to a multitude of factors. Id. at 3.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 7. The gender gap is relatively narrow within this 81%, with 85% of girls and 75%
of boys experiencing unwanted sexual behavior. Id.
12. Id. Forty-seven percent of the students surveyed who had been harassed were in grades
six through nine. Thirty-two percent of the students had been harassed prior to seventh grade
and six percent had been harassed prior to third grade. Id.
13. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 8-10. The number in parenthesis reflects the percentage of
students who have reported being the target of that particular harassment.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id. Eighty-six percent of the girls and seventy-one percent of the boys reported being
sexually harassed by a current or former student at school. Id.
17. Id. at 13.
18. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 13-14.
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tionally and behaviorally. 9 The educational impact includes students not
wanting to go to school or participate in class, receiving lower grades, and
finding it more difficult to study.' The emotional and behavioral reper-
cussions are even more alarming. Students not only suffered embarrass-
ment, fear, and feelings of inadequacy, but were affected in such a way
that caused many to change their seats or their route to and from school,
to stop attending certain activities, and to refrain from going to certain
areas within the school.21 In some instances, the harassment was so se-
vere that it caused students to become emotionally withdrawn or to
transfer to different schools.22
While all students suffer from the negative effects of sexual harass-
ment, the AAUW study makes it clear that young girls suffer dispropcr-
tionately.2 3 Girls are far more likely to experience the adverse conse-
quences associated with peer sexual harassment. In each of the study's
impact categories, the percentage of girls reporting a particular reaction
far outnumbered the percentage of boys reporting that reaction. For
instance, twenty-three percent of the students who were harassed felt
that they did not want to go to school; this number includes a mere
twelve percent of all boys responding to the survey, whereas it represents
thirty-three percent of all girls.' In addition, twenty-four percent of stu-
dents reported feeling afraid as a result of the harassment; only eight per-
cent of the boys are represented, whereas thirty-nine percent of the girls
are included in this number.2 It is clear from the disparity between these
percentages that, although sexual harassment has serious implications for
both girls and boys, it is, by far, a greater problem for girls than for boys.
It was imperative that some action be taken to prevent this type of con-
duct from continuing. The remedy was clear: the courts must assume the
responsibility of protecting these children by allowing Title IX actions to
proceed under the theory of peer sexual harassment.
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id. Nearly one in every four students (23%) who had been harassed reported that the
outcome was not wanting to attend school. Id.
21. Id. at 16-18.
22. Id. at 16. Three percent of students had actually changed schools as a result of sexual
harassment. Id.
23. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 15.
24. Id. at 15-18.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id. at 17.
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II. TiTLE IX
Through Title IX, the United States Congress seeks to prevent dis-
crimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational programs
by withholding federal financial support from those institutions engaged
in discriminatory practices." The language of the act provides that "[n] o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ...."'
The enactment of Title IX "was the culmination of efforts over sev-
eral years to ban gender discrimination in the field of education.' ' 9 The
act was intended to fill the gender gap that had been promulgated in
anti-discrimination legislation in the early 1960s." It was to fulfill this
goal by closing "loopholes in existing legislation relating to general edu-
cation programs and employment ... ."' The loopholes were found in
sections 601 ("Title VI")32 and 703 ("Title VII")33 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Title VI prohibited racial discrimination by all recipients of fed-
eral funding, including educational institutions, but did not ban gender
discrimination by recipients of these federal funds?4 Title VII prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sex, but did not apply to educational insti-
27. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). The court concluded that
"Title IX, like its model Title VI, sought to accomplish two related, but nevertheless somewhat
different objectives. First, Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices; second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection
against those practices." Id. See also 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)
("the heart of this amendment is a provisio,p banning sex discrimination in educational programs
receiving federal funds").
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
29. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
30. See 117 CONG. REC. 30,411 (1971) (statement of Sen. Cook) ("There is a gap in the laws
protecting women from biased educational policies.").
31. 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI provides that "[nmo person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance." Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
Id.




To close. these gaps, Congress undertook several attempts in the
early 1970s to enact legislation banning discrimination against women in
the field of education. 36 In 1970, a special House Subcommittee on Edu-
cation, chaired by Representative Edith Green, held hearings concerning
gender discrimination in education. The subcommittee drafted an
amendment that would have extended the prohibitions of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to discrimination on the basis of gender by add-
ing the word "sex" to section 601. 3v The amendment would have also
made Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to public school
employees and education employees generally.3 This amendment, how-
ever, never reached the floor of the House of Representatives.
One year later, in 1971, Senator Birch Bayh introduced an amend-
ment to the Education Amendments of 1971 that would have prohibited
recipients of federal education funds from discriminating against
women.39 Although this amendment was rejected as non-germane by the
United States Senate in 1971,' the anti-discrimination provision was
later included in a 1972 joint bill that is now known as Title IXO Thus,
Congress seemed to have bridged the gap between Title VI and Tide VII
by prohibiting sex discrimination in any education program receiving
federal funds. Unfortunately, Tide IX failed to specify either the criteria
needed to establish a sex discrimination claim or the method, if any, by
which a person could bring suit to challenge such discrimination.42 This
responsibility was left to the courts.
III. THE COURT'S RECOGNITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AS ACTIONABLE SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE IX
Under Title IX, the express statutory means of enforcement are ad-
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. This section states that the Act "shall not apply... to a[n] ...
educational institution. . . ." Id.
36. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523 n.13 (1982).
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,156 (1971). This amendment, like that of Representative
Green's subcommittee proposal in 1970, extended the provisions of Title VI to include gender.
117 CONG. REC. 30,156. Senator Bayh urged the Senate to adopt the amendment because it
would be an "effective remedy designed to root out, as thoroughly as possible at the present
time, the social evil of sex discrimination in education." 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972).
40. See 117 CONG. REC. 30,415 (1971).
41. See 118 CONG. REC. 22,702 (1972).
42. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). This section provides no guidance as to how a private
claim should be brought under the statute.
334 Vol. 37:329
1999 Peer Sexual Harassment in Educational Institutions 335
ministrative. The statute directs federal agencies that distribute educa-
tional funding to establish requirements by which the anti-discrimination
provisions of the act are to be achieved.43 The agencies are permitted to
enforce these requirements through any lawful means, including the ter-
mination of federal funding." The act does not expressly authorize a pri-
vate cause of action for sex discrimination.
Seven years after Title IX's enactment, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the absence of such a right in Cannon v. University of
Chicago.4" In Cannon, a female who had been denied admission to medi-
cal schools at two private universities that received federal financial as-
sistance brought suit under Title IX, alleging discrimination on the basis
of sex.' The Court recognized that Title IX did not expressly authorize a
private cause of action47 and noted that not every violation of a federal
statute automatically gives rise to such right.' Rather, the Court deter-
mined that, before it could decisively conclude that Congress intended to
establish a private remedy, it must examine several factors that would be
indicative of such intent.49
The Court first examined whether the statute was enacted for the
43. Id. at § 1682. This section provides the following:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal fi-
nancial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and di-
rected to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to
such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general appli-
cability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the stat-
ute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is
taken.
Id.
44. Id. The Act provides for enforcement as follows:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be ef-
fected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance un-
der such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an ex-
press finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply
with such requirement ... or (2) by any other means authorized by law ....
Id.
45. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
46. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680. Plaintiff alleged that she was denied enrollment into these
institutions despite the fact that males with less impressive objective qualifications were being
admitted. Id. at n.2. Moreover, it was alleged that the schools' admission policies operated to
exclude women from consideration even though the criteria were not valid predictors of per-
formance in medical school. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari after both
the district court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaints for failure to state a cause of action. Id. at n.2. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
406 F.Supp. 1257 (N.D. 11. 1976); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir.
1976).
47. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 683.
48. Id. at 688. See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
49. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688.
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benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member. After focusing
on the language of the statute, the Court found that Title IX "explicitly
confers a benefit on persons discriminated against on the basis of sex.'"0
Second, the Court looked to the legislative history to see whether Ccn-
gress had expressed a legislative intent to either create or deny a remedy.
The Court concluded that, although it is unnecessary to show such an
intent once it is clear that the language of the statute provides for a rea-
edy, the history of Title IX clearly indicates that Congress did intend
such a remedy." Third, the Court considered whether the remedy was
helpful to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose. In concluding
that a private action was helpful, the majority explained that, in some
instances, individuals could not be provided effective protection against
discriminatory practices absent a private remedy 2 Finally, the Court
examined whether this subject matter was of the type normally relegated
to the states. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted that the fed-
eral courts have long been the primary source of protection for citizens
against discrimination of all sorts. 3 Therefore, the Court concluded that
"[n]ot only the words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter
and underlying purposes, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor
of private victims of discrimination.
54
Although the Cannon Court expressly recognized a private cause of
action for violations of Tide IX subsequent sexual harassment claims by
students were not brought under Tide IX because the only available
remedy was equitable relief. Instead, most Title IX claims were brought
by students pursuing equitable gender funding in scholastic sports pro-
grams." Then, in 1992, the Supreme Court altered the future of Title IX
claims with its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools. 6
In Franklin, the plaintiff, a high school student, brought a Tide IX
50. Id. at 693-94. The Court found support for this reasoning in the fact that Congress could
have limited the language of Title IX to simply ban discriminatory conduct by recipients of fed-
eral funds but, instead, drafted the statute with an "unmistakable focus on the benefitted class."
Id. at 691.
51. Id. at 694. The Court determined that Title IX was clearly patterned after Title VI and
that the drafters of Title IX assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had
been since 1964. Id. at 696 n.19. When Title IX was passed in 1972, Title IV had already been
construed as creating a private remedy. Id. at 696.
52. Id. at 706 n.37. For example, institutions that received federal funds in a single grant
would not worry about violations of Title IX if the only remedy were to terminate funds because
they would not be entitled to further disbursements in any event.
53. Id. at 708.
54. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709.
55. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (lst Cir. 1993).
56. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
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claim alleging that a teacher had subjected her to continual sexual har-
assment and abuse." Franklin alleged that her teachers and administra-
tors knew of the harassment, did nothing to stop it, and even discouraged
her from pressing charges." The teacher accused of the abuse subse-
quently resigned on the condition that all complaints against him be
dropped. 9 Franklin filed a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights of
the United States Department of Education ("OCR"), which subse-
quently terminated its investigation after concluding that the school in-
stituted a grievance procedure that brought it into compliance with Title
IX' Unsatisfied with the result, Franklin filed suit in district court seek-
ing money damages for the school's violation of Tide IX. The district
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Title IX did not
authorize an award of money damages.61 The court of appeals62 affirmed
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the sole question of
"whether the implied right of action under Title IX... supports a claim
for monetary damages."'3
In examining this issue, the Court stated that the "question... [as
to] what remedies are available under a statute that provides a private
right of action is 'analytically distinct' from the issue of whether such a
right exists in the first place." Thus, the Court determined that, under
normal circumstances, it would need to examine the text and history of
Title IX to determine whether Congress intended to create a monetary
damages remedy. In doing so, The Court concluded that, unless Congress
had expressly indicated otherwise, it would presume the availability of all
appropriate remedies." However, because the private cause of action was
inferred by the Cannon Court, the usual textual and historical examina-
tion of Title IX would provide no insight as to the available remedies 5
Therefore, to determine whether Congress intended to limit the applica-
tion of all available remedies, the Court was forced to evaluate the state
57. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 64 n.3.
61. Id. at 64.
62. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990).
63. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 62.
64. Id. at 65. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ("[Wlhere legal rights have been in-
vaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.").
65. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71. Given that the Cannon Court held that there was no express
right of action provided for by the statute, this Court found no surprise in the fact that Congress
was silent as to any applicable remedies for an implied right of action. Id.
337
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of the law when Title IX was enacted.66 The Court found that, in the
years before and after Congress enacted Title IX, the Supreme Court
"follow[ed] a common-law tradition [and] regarded the denial of a ren-
edy as the exception rather than the rule."' The Court concluded that
the state of the law at the time of enactment amply demonstrated the
lack of any legislative intent to abandon the traditional presumption in
favor of all available remedies. Therefore, the majority held that money
damages are available when a private action is brought to enforce Title
IX
68
The significance of the Franklin opinion, however, goes beyond its
holding: it expressly expands the reach of Title IX to include sexual har-
assment as a violation thereunder. The Court noted that "Title IX placed
on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty not to discriminate on
the basis of sex, and when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor discriminates on the
basis of sex."' 9 Therefore, the effect of the Franklin opinion is not only to
allow monetary damages in a Title IX private action, but also to expressly
recognize the existence of a sexual harassment claim under Title IX.
IV. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY UNDER TITLE IX
Although the Franklin Court recognized the existence of a Title IX
sexual harassment claim, it failed to establish any guidelines under which
a school could be held liable. Thus, federal courts continued to lack Su-
preme Court guidance concerning claims for both teacher-student and
student-student sexual harassment. In cases in which students asserted
that they had been sexually harassed by teachers, federal court decisions
differed as to the standard of notice that was needed before a school
would be held liable. Some courts concluded that Title VII standards
should apply, holding schools liable if they "knew or should have known"
that the sexual harassment was taking place," whereas other courts
found that the school could be held liable even if the victim of the har-
assment failed to notify the proper officials.71 The Supreme Court finally
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 375 (1982)).
68. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
69. Id. at 7 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
70. See Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1528 (M.D. Ala.
1994); Kinman v. Omaha Public School Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cit. 1996).
71. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900-01 (1st Cir. 1988).
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addressed this issue in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District."
In Gebser, a student became intimately involved with one of her
teachers. The relationship began with Mr. Waldrop, Gebser's teacher,
making suggestive comments.73 This conduct eventually led to kissing,
fondling, and intercourse.7 4 Gebser did not report the relationship to
school officials because she felt uncertain about how to react 5 The rela-
tionship continued for approximately a year and a half until a police offi-
cer discovered Waldrop and Gebser having intercourse and arrested
Waldrop. 6 The school then terminated Waldrop."7
Gebser subsequently brought suit under Title IX seeking compen-
satory and punitive damages. The district court and the appellate coure'
dismissed her claim, holding that the school could not be held liable un-
less it actually knew of the harassment 9 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide "when a school district may be held liable in damages
in an implied right of action under Title IX" for teacher-student sexual
harassment. " The Court rejected Gebser's argument that schools should
be held liable under a theory of either respondeat superior or constructive
notice."1 Instead, the Court held that a damages remedy will not lie un-
der Title IX "unless an official who at minimum has authority to address
the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of the discrimination in the re-
72. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
73. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Just three months before Waldrop's arrest, two students had complained to their
principal about his suggestive comments in class. The principal cautioned Waldrop about his
behavior but did not report the incident to the superintendent, who was the district's Title IX
coordinator. Id. The district had neither instituted a grievance policy for reporting sexual har-
asssment claims nor issued a formal anti-harassment policy. Id.
77. Id.
78. Doe v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997)
79. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1994 (citing Doe v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 106 F.3d
1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[Sichool districts are not liable in tort for teacher-student sexual
harassment under Title IX unless an employee who had been invested by the school board with
supervisory power over the offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end
the abuse, and failed to do so.").
80. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
81. Id. at 1995. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a school would be held liable
when a teacher uses his or her position of authority to carry out sexual harassment irrespective
of whether school officials had knowledge of or took action to eliminate it. Under the doctrine
of constructive notice, a school would be held liable if it knew or should have known about the
harassment but failed to uncover and stop it. Id. The Court rejected these doctrines arguing
that Title IX, unlike Title VII, contains no comparable reference to "agents" and thus does not
call for application of agency principles. Id. at 1996.
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cipient's programs" and acts with "deliberate indifference" in failing to
respond to the alleged discrimination.2
Although the Supreme Court set a standard of institutional liability
for claims of teacher-student sexual harassment in Gebser, it did not set a
standard of institutional liability for claims of the more pervasive student-
student sexual harassment. 3 Without guidance from the Supreme Court
on this issue, the circuit courts were unable to agree on whether schools
can be held liable under Title IX for peer sexual harassment, and, if so,
under what standard of liability.
V. APPELLATE CONFLICT OVER PEER SExuAL HARASSMENT
A. No Liability under Title IX
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,"4 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit, in a five-four decision, held that no cause
of action existed for a student against a school board or its officials under
Title IX for failure to prevent student-student sexual harassment of
which the board or its members had knowledge. LaShonda Davis, a fifth-
grade student, was subjected to eight separate instances of sexual harass-
ment from a fellow student over a six-month period 5 The harassment
included vulgarities and suggestive comments, as well as the touching of
her body.86 As a result of the harassment, Davis suffered mental anguish
that ultimately resulted in lowered grades and suicidal tendencies 7
During this period, school officials were made aware of the harassment
but failed to take any significant remedial action.88 As a result, Davis
brought an action claiming that the school board's deliberate indifference
to the sexual offenses amounted to a violation of Title IX.9
82. Id. at 1999-2000. The Court explained that "it would frustrate the purposes of Title IX
to permit a damages recovery against a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a
student.. . without actual notice to a school district official." Id. at 1997.
83. See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 11.
84. 120 F.3d 1390 (1lth Cir. 1997, rev'd, No. 97-843, 1999 WL 320808 (U.S. May 24, 1999).
85. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1394.
86. Id. at 1393. The harassing student's conduct included statements such as "I want to get
in bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs." Id.
87. Id. at 1394.
88. Id. at 1393-94.
89. Id. at 1394. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862
F.Supp. 363, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
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The circuit court framed the issue as "whether Title IX allows a
claim against a school board based on a school official's failure to remedy
a known hostile environment caused by the sexual harassment of one
student by another." The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that, al-
though ten district courts have allowed a Tide IX action in a peer sexual
harassment scenario, there was no binding authority because, at that
point, the Supreme Court had not yet squarely addressed the issue of
student-student sexual harassment9 The court began its analysis by ex-
amining the legislative history of Title IX. The majority found that al-
though the Act's history does not explicitly mention student-student
sexual harassment, it does show that Title IX was enacted under the
Spending Clause of Article I of the Constitution.92
The court explained that when Congress enacts legislation pursuant
to the Spending Clause, a contract is, in essence, formed between the
federal government and the recipient of the fundsO3 As a result, Congress
must give recipients unambiguous notice of the conditions that they are
agree to when they accept federal fundingY4 In this case, the court con-
cluded that Congress did not give "clear notice to schools and teachers
that they, rather than society as a whole, would accept responsibility for
remedying student-student sexual harassment when they chose to accept
federal financial assistance under Title IX. Although the court de-
clined to recognize a Title IX action, it suggested that state tort law may
provide redress for the harm."
B. When Schools Can Be Held Liable under Tide IX
In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit refused to find schools liable for peer
sexual harassment under any circumstances; In contrast, other circuit
courts have interpreted Title IX to encompass institutional liability for
such harassment. However, these circuits have not agreed upon a single
standard under which Tide IX liability should be imposed for student-
student sexual harassment. The various circuits have developed three
90, Davis, 120 F.3d at 1394.
91. Id. at 1395.
92. Id. at 1397.
93. Id. at 1399.
94. Id. at 1406. ("An enactment under the spending clause must read like a prospectus ...
land] must unambiguously disclose to would-be recipients all facts material to their decision to
accept Title IX funding."). Id.
95. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1406.
96. Id.
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separate theories of liability: the "knew or should have known" standard;
the "response to claims differing on basis of sex" standard; and the "ac-
tual knowledge" standard.
1. The "Knew or Should Have Known" Standard
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University,97
two members of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute ("VPI") football team
raped the plaintiff, a freshman at the university 8 Seven months after the
incident, she filed a complaint under VPI's sexual assault policy." How-
ever, as a result of VPI's alleged negligence in dealing with the matter,
Brzonkala filed suit in district court alleging that VPI's handling of her
rape claims and failure to punish the rapists in any meaningful manner,
violated Title IX. The district court dismissed the Tide IX claim
against VPI for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.'0 ' The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding
that Brzonkala had sufficiently established a Title IX hostile environment
sexual harassment claim against VPI.' °2
In analyzing the claim, the court first looked to what legal standard
should be applied to a hostile environment claim under Tide IX."3 The
majority concluded that, because of Title IX's "short historical parent-
age," it would need to "look to the extensive jurisprudence developed in
the Title VII context.""' The court explained that Title IX is similar to
Title VII because, in a Title IX action, the plaintiff seeks not to hold the
97. 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
98. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953. The football players took turns raping the plaintiff, using
their arms to pin down her elbows and their knees to spread apart her legs. Id. The players did
not use condoms and threatened her by saying "[ylou better not have any... diseases." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 956. The university judicial committee found one of the players guilty of sexual
assault and immediately suspended him for two semesters. Id. at 955. However, on appeal, the
university provost concluded that the sanction was excessive and deferred the suspension until
graduation. Id.
101. Id. at 956. See also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State Univ., 935
F.Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996).
102. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 961.
103. Id. at 957.
104. Id. ASee Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203, 207 (4th
Cir. 1994) ("Title VII, and the judicial interpretations of it, provide a persuasive body of stan-
dards to which we may look in shaping the contours of a private right of action under Title
IX."); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Title VII..
is the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards . . .-); Lipsett
v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Because Title VII prohibits the identi-
cal conduct prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination," Title VII is "the most appropriate
analogue when defining Title IX=s substantive standards. . ."). Id.
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school responsible for the acts of third parties but, rather, to hold the
school responsible for its own actions in failing to take prompt and reme-
dial action. O
The court then looked to Tide VII for guidance and concluded that,
for a plaintiff to prevail on a Tide IX hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claim, he or she must show:
(1) that she [or he] belongs to a protected group; (2) that she [or he] was sub-
ject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on
sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of his [or her] education and create an abusive educational en-
vironment; and, (5) that some basis for institutional liability has been estab-
lished.1
0 6
VPI did not contest the first three elements but contended that the
fourth and fifth were not satisfied.
Applying the facts of this case to the last two elements, the court
first concluded that rape "is not only pervasive harassment but also
criminal conduct of the most serious nature that is plainly sufficient to
state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment."'01 The court
then addressed the final element. Applying Tide VII standards, the na-
jority determined that VPI would be liable if it "knew or should have
known of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and adequate
remedial action."" The court concluded that VPI knew of the rapes
once Brzonkala informed the appropriate official, and that it failed to
take prompt and remedial action by refusing to provide significant pun-
ishment to the offenders or any real assistance to the victim.' 9
2. The "Response to Claims Differing on Basis of Sex" Standard
In Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,"' the Fifth Circuit
held that Title IX does not impose liability on a school district for peer
sexual harassment, absent allegations that the school district itself di-
105. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 958. Similarly, under a Title VII action, a plaintiff cannot recover
from her employer simply because she was harassed by a fellow employee; she may only recover if
the "employer knew or should have known of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and
adequate remedial action." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 959. The court also reasoned that there was no doubt that "even a single incident
of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions" of the victim's education to create an abusive
educational environment. Id.
108. Id. at 960.
109. Id. at 961.
110. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
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rectly discriminated by responding differently to sexual harassment claims
on the basis of sex. 1' The plaintiffs in Rowinsky, two sisters in the eighth
grade, were subjected to both physical and verbal abuse from fellow sin-
dents during the 1992-93 school year." 2 The principal and superinten-
dent were informed of the harassment on several different occasions,
which led to the three-day suspension of one of the harassing students.13
However, because the suspension did not deter the harassment and be-
cause the district refused to take further action against any of the other
boys, Mrs. Rowinsky brought a Title IX action on behalf of her daughters
alleging that the Bryan Independent School District ("BISD") and its
employees condoned and caused hostile environment sexual
harassment".'
The district court dismissed the case, holding that Rowinsky had
failed to state a claim under Title IX because there was no evidence that
BISD had discriminated against students on the basis of sex. 15 In par-
ticular, Rowinsky had failed to show that sexual harassment was treated
less severely when its victims were girls than when they were boys.1 6 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit framed the issue as "whether a school district
may be liable under Title IX when one student sexually harasses an-
other." ' v In its analysis, the court focused on "who" is prohibited from
discriminating against students in an educational program. The majority
concluded that the scope and structure of the act itself, the legislative
history, and agency interpretations of the statute all support the imposi-
tion of liability under Title IX for the acts of federal fund recipients and
not for the acts of third parties.1
The court reasoned that, because Title IX was enacted pursuant to
Congress' spending power, Congress could not have intended a condition
that imposes liability for acts of third parties; such a condition would de-
111. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016.
112. Id. at 1008-09. The abuse included fellow students reaching up the sisters' skirts, grab-
bing their genitals, unlatching their bras, swatting their bottoms whenever they walked down the
bus aisle, and making comments such as, "When are you going to let me fuck you" and "What
bra size are you wearing." Id.
113. Id. at 1008.
114. Id. at 1009-10. Mrs. Rowinsky sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as com-
pensatory damages and attorney's fees. Id. at 1010.
115. Id. at 1010.
116. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010. The district court found that boys who assaulted boys were
punished in the same fashion as were boys who assaulted girls. Id.
117. Id. In more general terms, the court noted that "we are asked to decide whether the
recipient of federal education funds can be found liable for sex discrimination when the perpe-
trator is a party other than the grant recipient or its agents." Id.
118. Id. at 1012.
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ter acceptance of federal funds.'19 The majority also determined that Ti-
de IX's legislative history focuses solely on the acts of grant recipients,
with the intent to end discrimination by educational institutions.'20 Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the OCR's interpretation of Title IX was
also consistent with the refusal to impose liability for acts of third
parties.1
2 1
In light of these factors, the court held that, in a case of peer sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the school district re-
sponded to sexual harassment claims differently on the basis of sex."
The majority noted that this standard would be satisfied if a "school
treated sexual harassment of boys more seriously than [it treated] sexual
harassment of girls, or even if it turned a blind eye toward sexual harass-
ment of girls while addressing assaults that harmed boys."'1
2
3. The "Actual Knowledge" Standard
In Doe v. University of Illinois,'" Jane Doe, a female student, brought
a Title IX claim against the University of Illinois in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois claiming that school offi-
cials took little or no meaningful action to punish or prevent the sexual
harassment to which she was victim."z The harassment included un-
wanted touching, epithets, and the intentional exposure of one of the
harasser's genitals to Doe." Rather than protecting Doe or punishing
her harasser, some administrators insisted that the harassment was Doe's
fault and that she should change her behavior to prevent further occur-
rences. 27 The district court dismissed the Title IX action for failure to
state a cause of action.'l 8
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a
119. Id. at 1013.
120. Id at 1014.
121. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1014. The court explained that the agency's interpretation of Title
IX is devoted entirely to acts of the recipients themselves. Id. at 1015.
122. Id. at 1016.
123. Id.
124. 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998).
125. Doe, 138 F.3d at 655. "Doe was the victim of an ongoing campaign of verbal and physi-
cal sexual harassment perpetrated by a group of male students at the school." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 655-56. The district court found that the university could not be held liable be-
cause Doe had not alleged that the school officials' failure to respond resulted from intentional
discrimination against her. Id.
Duquesne Law Review
school can be held liable for failing to take prompt, appropriate action to
remedy known sexual harassment of one student by other students.129
The court held that a school could, indeed, be held for failing to take
prompt action in response to student-student sexual harassment, pro-
vided that the school's officials actually knew that the harassment was
taking place. 3'
In its analysis, the court rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
Rowinsky, holding that the Fifth Circuit improperly concluded that Title
IX does not impose liability on schools for the acts of third persons."'
The majority echoed Brzonkala, explaining that, in peer sexual harass-
ment cases, the plaintiffs seek not to hold the schools liable for the acts of
the harassing students but, rather, to hold schools and school officials
liable for their own actions or inaction once they knew the harassment
existed.'32 The court also rejected the Eleventh Circuit's Spending
Clause analysis as set forth in Davis.'33 The majority found that the Elev-
enth Circuit relied on a "lack of notice" theory to find that schools could
not be held liable under Title IX for peer sexual harassment.'34 However,
the court explained that the notice problem does not arise when the dis-
crimination is intentional and held that a failure to take prompt and im-
mediate action to remedy known sexual harassment constitutes inten-
tional sex discrimination. 1
35
In determining the proper standard of notice for school liability, the
court recognized that many courts have used Title VII precedent in am-
lyzing Tide IX suits. The majority, however, refused to apply the Title VII
"knew or should have known" standard of liability because of the exis-
tence of Seventh Circuit precedent that rejects this standard in favor of
an "actual knowledge" standard.136 The court found that this standard
"does not place too severe a burden on potential plaintiffs" by requiring
them to report the harassment to school officials, thereby giving a school
the chance to respond before being sued in court.
131
129. Id. at 660.




134. Id. at 663.
135. Doe, 138 F.3d at 663.
136. Id. at 667-68. The Court relied on the reasoning of Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist.
Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 1997), which in turn borrowed the rationale of
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. School Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 658 (1997) (recognizing the validity and
applicability of the "knew or should have known" standard as set forth by the OCR in its pro-
posed guidelines but refusing to apply the guidelines retroactively).
137. Doe, 138 F.3d at 668.
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VI. THE SUPREME COURT SETs THE STANDARD FOR PEER
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In May of 1999, the Supreme Court laid to rest the debate that had
been raging within the circuit courts of appeal. In Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education,138 the Court held that educational institutions can be
held liable for peer sexual harassment. 39 In doing so, the Court applied
the standard as set forth in its earlier Gebser decision and concluded that
schools can only be held liable for peer sexual harassment when its offi-
cials are deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-student sexual
harassment."4 Thus, for liability to attach, school officials must act in
clear violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of
student-student sexual harassment of which they had actual knowledge.
Relying on Gebser, the Court explained that any entity that receives
federal funds is entitled to notice that it will be liable for a monetary
award prior to it being subjected to damages liability. 41 Therefore, the
majority agreed with Gebser and rejected the more stringent standard,
whereby a school would be held liable for its failure to react to student-
student harassment of which it knew or should have known. The Court
concluded that this standard would not provide the notice of liability
required under Title IX. 42 The decision to adopt this standard, however,
will likely be detrimental in the prevention of peer sexual harassment in
the educational system.
VII. THE PROPER STANDARD FOR HOLDING SCHOOLS LIABLE
UNDER TITLE IX FOR PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT
It is well established that the text of Title IX should be accorded "a
sweep as broad as its language., 1 3 In keeping with this principle, a school
should be held liable under Title IX for peer sexual harassment if the
school's official "knew or should have known" of the sexual harassment
138. No. 97-843, 1999 WL 320808 (U.S. May 24, 1999), rev'g 120 F.3d 1390 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
139. Davis, 1999 WL 320808, at * 10.
140. Id.
141. Id. at*8.
142. Id. at *9.
143. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982); Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,307-08 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); United States v. Price, 387 U.S. 787 (1966).
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and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. This is
the standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala and by the
OC
In 1997, the OCR issued guidelines intended to inform educators
and educational institutions of the appropriate standards to be followed
under federal law when investigating and resolving claims of sexual har-
assment under Title IX.I" Under these guidelines, a school will be held
liable under Title IX for student-student sexual harassment if the follow-
ing circumstances are present: (1) a hostile environment exists in the
school's programs or activities; (2) the school knows or should have
known of the harassment; and (3) the school fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action.145 In these instances, a school's failure to
respond to the existence of a hostile environment within its own pro-
grams permits an atmosphere of sexual discrimination that is prohibited
by Title IX. 47 Therefore, Title IX holds a school liable not for the actions
of the harassing students but, rather for the school's own discrimination
in failing to adequately remedy the problem once it has notice."'
The notice standard set forth in OCR guidelines is whether the
school "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known"
about the harassment. 49 Thus, a school is put on notice if it actually
knew of the harassment or, through a theory of constructive notice, if it
should have known about the harassment through "reasonably diligent
inquiry.)
15 0
The OCR guidelines merit significant consideration by the courts.
The courts have long concluded that "when interpreting Title IX, [it is
appropriate to] ... accord the OCR's interpretations appreciable defer-
144. Office for Civil Rights; Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997).
145. Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039.
146. A hostile environment is created if "conduct of a sexual nature is sufficiently severe,
persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the education
program.... " Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,041.
147. Id. at 12,039.
148. Id. at 12,040. The Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky misinterpreted Title IX by reasoning that the
plaintiff was trying to use Title IX to hold the school liable for the acts of third parties. However,
the OCR guidelines clearly explain that Title IX holds a school liable, not for the actions of the
third parties, but, rather, for the school's own failure to take immediate remedial action. Id.
149. Id. at 12,042.
150. Id. at 12,042. Constructive notice exists in a situation where the school knows of some
incidents of harassment but negligently fails to undertake an investigation which would have led
to the discovery of additional incidents of harassment. Id. In addition, the pervasiveness of the
harassment may be enough to conclude that the school should have known of the hostile envi-
ronment. Id.
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ence."' 5S In fact, the Davis Court, without commenting on the standard
set forth by the OCR, expressly supported the OCR guidelines because
they provide for peer sexual harassment to be covered under Title IX.'52
It is not disputed that courts recognize the Department of Education,
acting through its OCR, as the administrative agency charged with al-
ministering Title IX. 3 The amount of deference that a court will give to
agency regulations, however, depends on such factors as the circum-
stances of the guidelines' promulgation, the consistency with which the
promulgating agency has adhered to the position announced, the consid-
eration that has gone into its formulation, and the agency's expertise.!54
When these factors are applied to the OCR guidelines, it is clear
that the courts should accord them substantial deference. The OCR cme-
ated the comprehensive set of guidelines setting forth the legal standards
involved in resolving incidents of sexual harassment in an effort to elini-
nate sexual harassment and in response to the requests of schools, teach-
ers, and parents.'55 The OCR guidelines reflect longstanding OCR policy
and practice in the area of sexual harassment. They also reflect extensive
consultation with groups representing students, teachers, school admn-
istrators, and researchers.'56 Through these meetings, the OCR "gained
valuable information regarding the realities of sexual harassment in
schools, as well as information regarding promising practices for identij-
ing and preventing harassment." '57 Therefore, under the rationale set
forth in North Haven and Batterton, the standards of liability set forth in
the OCR guidelines should be afforded considerable respect.
In addition to being incorporated into the OCR guidelines, the Tide
VII "knew or should have known" standard also works to satisfy both of
Title IX's objectives.' It is effective both in preventing federal resources
151. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982); Rowinsky v.
Bryan Indep. School Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014 n.20 (5th Cir. 1996); Rosa H. v. San Elizario
Indep. School Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 658 (5th Cir. 1997).
152. Davis, 1999 WL 320808, at *12.
153. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984); See also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (noting that the Supreme Court
"gives great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged
with its administration").
154. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977).
155. Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,034-35.
156. Id. at 12,035.
157. Id.
158. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). The court concluded that
Title IX "sought to accomplish two related, but nevertheless somewhat different objectives.
First, Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices;
second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices." Id.
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from being used to support discriminatory practices and in providing in-
dividual citizens effective protection against those practices. Contrary to
the Seventh Circuit's holding in Doe and the Supreme Court's decision
in Davis, the "actual knowledge" standard cannot serve as the appropi-
ate limitation upon institutional liability because it does not fulfill Title
IX's objectives. The Supreme Court's decision to require schools to have
actual knowledge of the harassment, in effect, allows school officials to
turn their backs to harassment that, through reasonable inquiry, could
have been discovered and remedied. The "knew or should have known"
standard encompasses the actual knowledge standard and also addresses
situations in which a school should know about the harassment. This
more stringent standard would promote efficiency in the schools by forc-
ing officials to effectuate proper policies and regulations through which
ongoing sexual harassment can be uncovered and future incidents pre-
vented. At the same time, it would protect those schools from being
blind-sided by liability based upon events that officials could not have
known were taking place.
The Davis Court relied directly on the Gebser decision for the stan-
dard to be used in instituting educational liability. In Gebser, the majority
rejected the standard espoused by the OCR guidelines and adopted the
"actual knowledge" standard. 59 Despite its holding, Gebser actually
strengthens the argument for a "knew or should have known standard"
for student-student sexual harassment.
The Gebser Court rejected the "knew or should have known stan-
dard" for two primary reasons. First, the majority reasoned that Title IX,
unlike Title VII, contains no reference to the concept of agency and,
therefore, does not expressly call for the application of agency
principles.)" When considering student-student sexual harassment,
however, agency principles are irrelevant. The victim of student-student
sexual harassment seeks to hold the school liable for its own failure to
remedy the harassment once it was put on notice rather than to hold the
school liable for a teacher's or student's harassment.
Second, the Court determined that, because Title IX was enacted
pursuant to Congress' spending power, it creates a contract with the re-
cipient of federal funding that requires that notice be given of the pote-
tial for monetary liability. 6' In Gebser, the Court concluded that, if a
school's liability were governed by the "knew or should have known
standard," the notice requirement would be violated because a school
159. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
160. Id. at 1996.
161. Id. at 1998.
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could be held liable for discrimination of which it was unaware. 62 This
argument fails to accurately depict the effect of the "knew or should have
known" standard. Under this standard, a school would be considered to
have notice of the harassment if it actually knew of the harassment or if it
should have known about the harassment through "reasonably diligent
inquiry." Therefore, contrary to the Court's suggestion in Gebser, the
school would not be unaware of the discrimination. Both of these argu-
ments relied on by Gebser Court do conclusively support the rejection of
respondeat superior liability (liability without regard to notice). However,
they also clearly support the use of the "knew or should have known"
standard in student-student sexual harassment cases.
CONCLUSION
Peer sexual harassment is a major problem in America's schools. It
has a crippling effect on students' educational environment as well as
their behavioral and emotional well-being. To deal with this acute prob-
lem, the courts must adopt a standard of liability under Title IX that will
promote a nationwide decrease in student-student sexual harassment. In
doing so, the courts must embrace a standard that furthers the objectives
of Title IX while providing protection to educational institutions from
discrimination of which they are legitimately unaware.
The Davis Court failed to fulfill these goals when it adopted the
"actual knowledge" standard. The Title VII "knew or should have
known" standard, however, effectively accomplishes these objectives. It
prevents the use of federal funds by institutions that either overtly sup-
port discriminatory practices or fail to take the necessary actions to rea-
edy those practices once they are put on notice that they exist. Morej-
ver, it protects students from peer sexual harassment by holding schools
financially liable for their own inaction in dealing with the conduct. The
OCR has adopted this standard with an understanding of its potential
impact on the educational system. The nation can only hope that the
Supreme Court will realize its mistake and adopt the standard as well.
Anthony M. Lamanna
162. Id.

